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ABSTRACT
Americans are suspicious of the gathering and use of personal
information by the government and the potential violations of
privacy that may result. This article surmises that this level of
suspicion varies depending on the types of personal information
acquired and the purpose for which it is being acquired. To test
this hypothesis, a survey was conducted to determine public
acceptance of the use of various forms of personal information to
achieve specific governmental objectives. The data revealed that
the public is, in fact, willing to accept the use of personal
information to achieve certain governmental objectives; however,
not without limitation. Factors that affected the level of
acceptance were the achievability of the policy, sensitivity of data
being used, the specific governmental objective, and trust in the
branch of government utilizing the data. In short, Americans must
have confidence in the paternalistic judgment of the government in
order to accept the gathering and use of their personal
information.
I. INTRODUCTION
The events of September 1 and the war on terror pose a unique
situation in which public attitudes toward the use of personal
information can be examined.' The threat of terrorism has prompted
government efforts to construct terrorist watch lists, create airline
screening programs and tighten border crossings with enhanced forms
of identity verification. Many of these security measures require the
overt, and sometimes covert, collation of various forms of personal
information from the American public. It would seem that an analysis
of the law might yield a relatively simple answer to the question of
whether the use of personal information for the achievement of policy
objectives is appropriate. But, is there more to the story? Are there
instances when the public is more willing to accept the use of
information for particular governmental objectives? Does the public's
* Lisa Nelson, J.D., Ph.D., is a professor at the University of Pittsburgh, Graduate School of
Public and International Affairs.
1 As will be discussed, the phrase "personal information" is broken down into particular forms
of information to assess how different forms of data might be perceived as potentially
violating a sense of privacy or liberty.
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confidence in the government's ability to achieve a policy objective
affect attitudes about secrecy and loss of privacy? How does the
public perceive the use of personal information for the purpose of
fighting the war on terror? Do levels of sensitivity differ depending
upon the type of personal information that is being acquired, the
purpose for which it is used and the public policy benefit achieved?
The answers to these questions are necessary in order to understand
societal acceptance of the use of personal information to achieve
policy objectives. An analysis of the law alone may not yield a
complete picture.
These questions were the focus of a 100 person survey which was
conducted in the summer of 2004. As a preliminary step toward
understanding the complicated relationship between data sensitivity,
governmental policy objectives and public perceptions of privacy and
civil liberties, this survey was designed to assess public acceptance of
the use of various forms of personal information to achieve specific
governmental objectives. These governmental objectives included,
among others: airline safety, border security, verification of tax payer
information, and attempts to track down parents who were delinquent
in their child support payments. The data revealed that the public was
willing to accept the use of personal information to achieve particular
governmental objectives with some caveats. Degrees of acceptance
were affected by the confidence in the achievability of the policy
directive, the sensitivity of data being used, the type of governmental
objective, and confidence and trust in the particular branch of
government tasked with achieving the objective. The following
discussion will sketch out the nuances of public perceptions of data
sensitivity, governmental objectives and levels of confidence and trust
in government. This article will also discuss the implications for
public tolerance of governmental secrecy.
II. PATERNALISM AND SECuRITY: THE PAST, THE PRESENT
AND THE FuTURE
The philosophical lens through which these questions are
examined is paternalism. One might think that the reference made to
paternalism is to the mantra of "big brother," which became common
in the post-September 11 environment. This is not the intended
reference. Instead, the use of paternalism in this discussion refers to
the long standing historical and theoretical concept in democratic
theory. This is not to say that paternalism is an accepted fact of
democratic governance. To the contrary, the exercise of paternalistic
decision making is, and has been, the subject of great debate in which
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the question of societal acceptance looms large. Theorists important to
our democratic tradition, such as John Stuart Mill and John Locke,
looked upon paternalism as a potential threat to individual liberty.
Ironically, they also considered it necessary for the preservation of
liberty in society. For instance, Locke wrote:
It may perhaps be censured as an impertinent criticism, in a
discourse of this nature, to find fault with words and names
that have obtained in the world; and yet possibly it may not
be amiss to offer new ones when the old are apt to lead men
into mistakes, as this of 'paternal power' probably has
done...2
According to John Stewart Mill, however, the exercise of paternal
power in democratic governance presents itself as a necessary evil. As
Mill explains, there are times when political authority is justified in its
interference with the liberty of the individual. Thus, the protection of
liberty in society sometimes requires the diminution of the liberty of
the individual. This is an ironic necessity in a democratic context, as
Mill explains:
... That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good,
either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He
cannot be rightfully compelled to do or forbear because it
will be better for him to do so, because it will make him
happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be
wise, or even right. These are good reasons for
remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or
persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling
him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise.3
These countervailing arguments surround the philosophical concept of
paternalism and animate discussions about the use of personal
information to achieve government policy objectives. In addition,
2 John Locke, "The First Treatise of Government," in Two Treatises of Government, ed.
Thomas I. Cook (New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1947), 146.
' John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, Etc. (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), (Orig. pub.
1859), 15.
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these arguments may shed light on shifting societal perceptions of the
appropriateness of government policy objectives. While the ideas of
John Stuart Mill and John Locke may seem far from the current policy
debates, their philosophical insights on the appropriate exercise of
paternalist political power are important to understanding the
relationship between the use of personal information and the ongoing
protection of civil liberties and privacy. Locke and Mill did not argue
that the measure of appropriate paternalistic power was that of the law.
Instead, the judgment of paternalist action was measured by the harm
to be prevented. In the current debate involving governmental use of
personal information for various policy objectives, the measure is not
markedly different from that envisioned by Locke and Mill, though
privacy advocates would have society believe otherwise. Determining
whether harm was prevented seems to better measure societal
acceptance of the use of personal information to achieve a policy
objective than measuring the privacy that might be lost. Whether the
public is willing to accept the use of personal information to achieve a
policy objective is not solely a legal question. In fact, it seems that a
normative assessment of the harm to be prevented by the policy
objective drives the acceptance of personal information. Yet, it is not
the mere identification of harm which drives the public's acceptance of
the use of personal information, a paternalistic action. There are
circumstances in which the public will accept paternalistic intervention
involving the use of personal information for the achievement of a
policy objective, and there are circumstances where the public will not.
III. THE PARAMETERS OF PATERNALISM
Part of understanding the acceptance and appropriateness of
paternalism is coming to terms with its definition. As VanDeVeer
explains, the implicit meaning attributed to paternalism is a well
intentioned or benevolent motive or, in his words, the
"characterization of a paternalistic act as one in which one party
interferes with another for the sake of the other's own good.'A
Evaluation of paternalistic actions is not legal in nature. Therefore,
societal acceptance hinges upon whether the action taken is ethical or
morally saleable.
The difficulty in evaluating paternalism is that the actions or
practices might prevent harm, promote welfare interests of subjects, or
4 Donald VanDeVeer, Paternalistic Intervention: The Moral Bounds on Benevolence
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 17.
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"blind us to the morally significant cost of such policies." 5 An ethical
theory of paternalism includes a duty to protect against harm but also
acknowledges an implicit moral constraint. Of course, for each
different exercise of paternalistic power, it is likely that the moral
constraints differ as well. In the case of the use of personal
information for the achievement of policy objectives, how does the
public evaluate the benevolence of motive and the achievement of a
good?
Returning to Mill at this point can be helpful in laying the
philosophical groundwork for understanding the substance of the
survey questions. From Mill's perspective, the markers for acceptable
paternalistic acts are found in the prevention of harm. The prevention
of harm, however, is not so easily assessed when the use of personal
information serves a range of policy objectives and, at the same time,
presents a potential threat to privacy and civil liberties. This is not the
easy case that Mill imagined. Mill wrote that,
[i]f either a public officer or any one else saw a person
attempting to cross a bridge which had been ascertained to
be unsafe, and there were no time to warn him of his danger,
they might seize him and turn him back, without any real
infringement of his liberty; for liberty consists in doing what
one desires, and he does not desire to fall into the river."
6
In Mill's straightforward example, liberty is not affected when an
individual is prevented from a danger that he or she would not want to
choose. The danger of falling off the bridge is not in conflict with the
individual's choice not to fall off the bridge. The important difference
is that paternalistic power is acceptable if it prevents a harm like that
of terrorism. However, unlike falling off of a bridge, an act of
terrorism is random and unpredictable in nature. Thus, the liberty
interests that individuals have vested in personal information might be
compromised to prevent the wider ranging, often invisible danger that
terrorism presents. Individuals may want to avoid a terrorist act, but
they may also want to make some choices about the divulgence of
personal information that run counter to the governmental interest in
achieving a policy objective. The paternalistic act in this instance also
becomes a potential threat to the liberty interests of individuals
' Ibid, 425.
6 Mill, On Liberty, Etc., 118.
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because, unlike falling off a bridge, the choices that they want to make
may be precluded in the name of preventing harm. Mill warns that this
is a potential threat to an individual's liberty in these instances because
the paternalistic action taken to prevent harm treads on delicate
philosophical ground. Factor in secrecy, and the societal acceptance of
paternalistic acts becomes even more problematic.
While paternalism presents a potential threat to liberty, the
preservation of liberty does not simply require an absence of
governmental paternalism. The exercise of paternalism is, in fact,
necessary to preserve liberty in the face of harm. The question is:
when is it appropriate to interfere with liberty to prevent harm? The
calculus is strikingly simple according to Mill:
1. S's liberty to do X is infringed only ifS desires to do X.
2. S does not desire to do X.
3. Therefore, S's liberty to do X is not infringed.7
As VanDeVeer observes, Mill's calculus for evaluating
paternalistic actions is valid but presents a potential problem. "Being
at liberty to perform an act is more appropriately characterized in
terms of the absence of constraints or barriers to certain possible
courses of action-independently of whether I do or will desire to
perform them."
8
In Mill's bridge example, no liberty interest is at stake because the
choice to fall off the bridge is not one that we expect the individual to
make. The liberty of choice might be compromised in a number of
ways distinct from the example given by Mill. Here, VanDeVeer's
insight is relevant to our discussion of acceptable paternalistic acts that
make use of personal information. It is the perceived constraint on
possible choices, in addition to the actual constraints, that represents
the potential loss of liberty in the use of personal information to
achieve a policy objective. In other words, even if a legal right is not
being violated, the mere perception that it is being violated is cause
enough for a lack of societal acceptance. Paternalistic actions taken to
prevent terrorist threats, for instance, represent the potential existence
of both actual and perceived constraints on liberty. For this reason, it
is important to understand societal perceptions of constraints when
determining whether paternalistic action is acceptable.
7 VanDeVeer, Paternalistic Intervention, 30.
' Ibid.
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In considering possible consequences for liberty, paternalistic
actions may not simply impinge upon a person's liberty of action.
Paternalistic actions may also entail withholding information from the
public or using information in a way that is not known by the public.
According to VanDeVeer, "[p]atemalism is the interference with a
person's freedom of action or freedom of information, or the
dissemination of misinformation, or the overriding of a person's
decision not to be given information, when this is allegedly done for
the good of that person." 9 Allen Buchanan uses this definition of
paternalism to address the type of interference with information that
might occur in a doctor-patient relationship, but the analogy applies to
governmental control of information. While there may be a more
direct analogy to withholding information related to terrorist threats,
the government might also use different forms of information to verify
an individual's identity, run a screening process or profile potential
terrorists, all without the explicit knowledge of those individuals. The
interference is to the individual's liberty interest through the control of
information and not through a direct action. This control of
information might also limit an individual's range of possible choices
because it is not always clear to society how and when personal
information is being used in a manner that would potentially violate a
sense of autonomy or anonymity.
Paternalistic actions of this type are perhaps more problematic than
those that interfere with liberty of action. Consider an analogy to the
case of a physician withholding information from a patient. The
justification is also framed in terms of a prevention of harm. As
Buchanan states, it is "disarmingly simple."' 10 The argument is as
follows:
1. The physician's duty-to which she is bound by the Oath of
Hippocrates-is to prevent or at least to minimize harm to her
patient.
2. Giving the patient information X will do great harm to him.
3. Therefore, it is permissible for the physician to withhold
information X from the patient. 11
9 Allen E. Buchanan, "Medical Paternalism," in Paternalism, ed. Rolf Sartorius (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 62.
'
0 Ibid, 66.
" Ibid.
2006]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
The duty to protect the patient from harm is not unlike the
government's duty to prevent harm. The similarity involves the duty
owed and the responsibility given to both the physician to protect the
patient's interests and to the government to protect society's interests.
The judgment to withhold or divulge information is made by those
who control the information, whether it is a physician or the
government. As Buchanan described, the judgment is not so easily
evaluated:
[W]e begin to see the tremendous weight that this
paternalistic argument places on the physician's power of
judgment. She must not only determine that giving the
information will do harm or even that it will do great harm.
She must also make a complex comparative judgment: Will
withholding the information result in less harm on balance
than divulging it?1
2
The dilemma of judgment is very similar for both the physician
and the government. Whether it is the judgment of a doctor or a
physician, the decision to control information by withholding or
divulging it, is undertaken with the goal of preventing harm. Yet, in
each case, a harm might occur because of the preventative action
taken. Buchanan argues this point through an example of a patient
with terminal cancer. "[T]he physician must not only determine that
informing the patient would do great harm but that the harm would be
greater on balance than whatever harm may result from withholding
information.'' 13  The judgment entails a consideration of what the
patient may or may not be able to withstand given the diagnosis, and if
the patient may decide not to undergo chemotherapy because she
believes that it will not benefit her. Upon consideration of these
issues, the physician might decide not to tell the patient that she is
going to die regardless of the treatment. Whatever the evidence for the
judgment, the doctor is given a duty to assess what will be best for his
or her patient. The duty of the government to achieve a policy
objective, whether it is the administration of drivers' licenses or the
war on terror, is somewhat similar in that a judgment must be made to
withhold information or put information to use. Although harms are
weighed in all of these scenarios, the risk-requiring consideration is
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
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individual liberty will be affected by the handling of such information.
The paternalistic interference with an individual's liberty interest in
information is difficult because the harms are less apparent compared
to the harms from interfering with an individual's liberty of action.
In these instances, the acceptance of paternalistic action to achieve
a policy objective or to prevent a harm depends upon:
1. the public perceiving the action as an interference with their
liberty interest;
2. whether the justification of the action is persuasive; and,
3. whether there is trust and confidence in governmental
judgment.
Again, these matters are not defined by actual civil liberties and rights
but, rather, by the normative perceptions of interference with liberty.
For this reason, the perceptions of constraints or barriers on liberty are
perhaps even more important than the violation of legal rights and
liberties in evaluating and accepting paternalistic actions. Capturing
societal evaluations of paternalistic actions is no easy task, especially
when it turns on perceptions of constraints and barriers to liberty.
However, it is a necessary starting point for understanding the
complicated nature of perceptions of liberty.
IV. SOCIETAL ACCEPTANCE, DATA SENSITIVITY AND THE POSSIBLE
IMPLICATIONS FOR GOVERNMENTAL SECRECY
The findings discussed below provide insight into the factors
which affect the normative acceptance of paternalistic actions, while
providing an understanding of when a liberty interest in privacy may
be compromised by paternalistic action. The purpose of the survey
was to gauge societal perceptions of data sensitivity when that data
was to be used for particular policy objectives. A liberty interest in
privacy is much more than its legal dimensions, and thus,
understanding the acceptance of the use of personal information and
the liberty interest in privacy at stake is a normative endeavor. These
dimensions, the liberty interest in privacy and the evaluation of the
stated policy objectives, are framed by the concept of paternalism and
the terms under which it is acceptable to a polity.
The responses from the survey were the result of a random digit
dial telephone interview with one hundred respondents. The
respondents were almost two-thirds female (36% male and 64%
female), ranging in ages from 18 to 89. The large majority of these
respondents described themselves as white (85%). The second largest
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group represented was black or African-American (8%). Additionally,
3% were Hispanic, and 4% were Asian or Pacific-Islander. Almost
half (48%) of the respondents had a bachelor's degree or higher, and
28% of respondents had more than a four-year college degree. Fifty-
one percent of respondents had a two-year degree or some four-year
college education or less, and 4% of the respondents did not have a
high school degree. Politically, 32% of the respondents reported being
Republican, while 35% reported being Democrat. Another 13% of
respondents identified with another party, and the remaining 20% did
not affiliate themselves with any political party.
As part of the survey, some general questions regarding
perceptions of risk were posed. These questions on perceptions of risk
provide a context for understanding the type of paternalistic actions
that might be acceptably taken to achieve particular policy objectives.
The chance of another terrorist attack was probable in the minds of
many of the respondents.
Respondents' Fear Level of a Terrorist Attack
Occurring in the US Within One Year
50% .
40% "
&30%
2 20% N .
"10%
0% 'i
Very Fearful Somewhat Fearful Not at All Fearful
Fear Level
Figure 1: Respondents 'Fear Level of a Terrorist Attack Occurring in
the US Within One Year
More than half of the respondents (57%) were at least somewhat
fearful of another terrorist attack in the U.S. in the next year, while
42% were not at all fearful. Many respondents (81%) believed that
there was a high chance of another major terrorist attack in the U.S. In
fact, those who indicated that they were more fearful were
significantly more likely to favor the use of the following personal
information as an identity check when boarding a plane than those
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who were less fearful: (1) name (t = -2.166; p = .033), (2) address (t =
-2.238; p = .027), (3) Social Security Number (t = -2.513; p = .014),
and (4) credit card number (t = -2.719; p = .008). 14 Perceptions of
risks are likely to affect the acceptance of paternalistic action. Yet, it
is not only the harm of terrorism that defines a potential risk.
Respondents were also concerned about the increased usage of
personal information by the government. This risk, although quite
different from that of fighting terror, would also affect the societal
acceptance of paternalistic action taken with the usage of personal
information.
Respondents' Agreement with the Following Statement: "I
am MORE worried about what the US government is doing
with personal data in the name of national security than I
was 5 years ago."
50%
* 4 0 % -B 30%2  - .41%
CL 10% 9%
0%
Strongly Agree Agree Disagree or Strongly
Disagree
Level of Agreement
Figure 2: Respondents 'Agreement with the Following Statement:
"I am MORE worried about what the US government is doing with
personal data in the name of national security than I was 5 years
ago.
While the war on terror was one context in which societal
perception of paternalistic action to achieve a policy goal was gauged,
it was not the only one. As discussed above, paternalist action is quite
commonplace in a democratic context, as is the use of personal
information for governmental objectives. The survey began by
14 The 't is the value that emerges from the test, and it is checked against a probability table.
The 'p' refers to probability. If the probability is less than .05, the difference is significant at
the .05 level. If the probability is below .05, there is a significant result.
2006]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
informing respondents that certain forms of personal data were already
being used for particular public policy purposes. For instance,
respondents were informed that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
uses personal information such as name, address, date of birth, and
social security number, to make sure that people have filled out their
tax returns accurately, and that the IRS does this by matching
information from the tax returns with information from other
organizations regarding payments and other kinds of transactions.
This was done to establish current acceptance of the use of personal
information to achieve policy objectives and to better understand
acceptance of paternalistic actions in general.
The survey found that 70% of respondents reported being aware of
this use of personal information, establishing a baseline for knowledge
of information usage. The survey then determined how supportive
individuals were of using such data for this public policy purpose,
finding that 70% of respondents were in favor of using personal
information in this way. To gauge the effect that data sensitivity
would have on the perception that this use of personal information
would create a constraint on their liberty interest in privacy, the survey
queried respondents on whether they would support the use of
additional information. Sixty-two percent of respondents favored
using driver's license numbers for this purpose. Yet, on the question
of also using credit card information, only 23% were in favor.
The tipping point on societal acceptance of paternalistic action
taken under the auspices of the IRS turned on the type of information
that was being used and the purposes for which it was designated. The
use of credit card information was deemed unnecessary for the
achievement of the administrative purposes of the IRS and an
infringement on the respondents' liberty interest in privacy. The
acceptance of using particular forms of personal information seemed
driven by the type of information used and the perception that certain
information was not necessary to achieve the purpose stated by the
IRS. Personal information, such as driver's license number, social
security number, name, address and date of birth, seemed to be viewed
as personal information which was characteristically used to achieve
administrative purposes or policy objectives, while credit card
information was viewed as an illegitimate or unnecessary piece of
personal information.
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achieved? Like confidence in the judgment of a physician, acceptance
of paternalistic action might be affected by the existence of safeguards
that protect against erroneous judgment. For instance, respondents
were asked whether their willingness to provide personal information
would be affected favorably if DHS were to protect their information
according to various safeguards.
How Willing Respondents Would Be to Provide
Personal Information if Homeland Security...
0l
80%
.60%
440%
O20%%
20% -0%
a. Only Used Had the Met Privacy Provided a Updated Deleted the
if to Check System Standards Written Personal Info from
ID for Audited Privacy Info Their
Travelers Policy Database
Actions of Homeland Security
Figure 8: Respondents' Confidence Level in Homeland Security's Use
and Protection of Personal Information
All of the safeguards mentioned in the graph above are ones which
provide a substantiation of the type of judgment exercised. It seems
that confidence in the soundness of the judgment may be more
important than ensuring openness in the evaluation of paternalistic use
of personal information to achieve governmental objectives. This
finding seems consistent with other historical instances when societal
acceptance of paternalistic action turned on the evaluation of the
judgment being made by the government and not on the requirement
that all of the information be available to those for whom the decision
was made.
The public's acceptance of secrecy may be better understood by
coming to terms with the acceptance of paternalistic judgment in
representative government and the perception that the sanctity of
judgment must be ensured with safeguards. Throughout history, the
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Whether Respondents Favor the Use of
Identifiers by the IRS
80%
40%
.20%
SSN SSN + License SSN + Credit Card
Identifiers
Figure 3: Whether Respondents Favor the Use of
Identifiers by the IRS
Respondents were then queried about the use of personal
information by the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV).
Respondents were informed that the DMV uses a database with
information about all of the drivers in the United States, including:
name, address, date of birth, and social security number. The DMV
uses this database to determine whether a person who is trying to
obtain a driver's license in one state has ever had a license cancelled,
suspended, or revoked in another state. Only 37% of respondents
reported being aware of this use of their personal information for these
purposes; but, when queried about acceptance, 70% of respondents
were in favor of using the information in this way. Yet, when asked
about the use of credit card numbers, only 18% were in favor of using
this type of personal information for the administrative purposes of the
DMV.
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Figure 4: Whether Respondents Favor the Use of
Identifiers by the DMV
These responses can be contrasted with those received when
respondents were asked about their acceptance of the use of personal
information for the purposes of locating delinquent parents across state
lines. The respondents were informed that the database includes
things like name, address, date of birth, and social security number.
Ninety-one percent of respondents favored using social security
numbers, 94% favored using drivers' licenses, and a relatively large
percentage (43%) also favored using credit card numbers for this
purpose. Some respondents even suggested taking delinquent
payments from the credit card of the parent.
Whether Respondents Favor the Use of
Identifiers by the DMV
t 40%
20%
SSN + Credit Card
Identifiers
[Vol. 2:1
NELSON
Whether Respondents Favor the Use of Identifiers
to Locate Delinquent Parents
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Figure 5: Whether Respondents Favor the Use of Identifiers to Locate
Delinquent Parents
These baseline questions reveal some interesting dimensions of
societal acceptance of paternalistic action -involving personal
information. Respondents were more likely to accept 'the
governmental use of personal information, including credit cards, for
the pursuit Of so-called "dead-beat" dads. Although there was less
acceptance of the use of credit card numbers by the DMV or IRS,
respondents were generally supportive of using other pieces of
personal information to fulfill .the administrative mandates of each
bureaucracy. What might explain the different dimensions of societal
acceptance? The respondents balanced the goal of tracking down
"dead-beat" dads against the potential infringement of a liberty interest
in privacy. The balancing resulted in an overwhelming number of
people favoring tracking down "dead-beat" dads., What defined this
acceptance? The first considerations. are motive behind the policy
objective and the potential good to be achieved. Respondents were
willing to allow the use of more sensitive personal information to
achieve the policy goal, or "good," of finding delinquent parents.
Indeed, in future research, it 'would be interesting to explore the
societal dimensions of this "good" which informed the strength of this
response.
The finding that respondents'approved of using personal
information to track down "dead-beat" dads is congruent with finding
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that respondents who were accepting of the administrative goals
defined by the IRS and DMV and of the use of personal information
that each required. Respondents were also willing to cede information
to the DMV for a database with information about all of the drivers in
the United States, including name, address, date of birth, and social
security number. The DMV uses the information in this database to
determine whether a person who is trying to get a driver's license in
one state has ever had a license cancelled, suspended, or revoked in
another state. Societal acceptance was relatively high for this type of
use. Recall that the second evaluation of paternalistic action is defined
by control over personal information. In each of the above cases, the
use of personal information was acceptable as long as it was deemed
relevant to the policy goal and was viewed as achievable with the
information requested. In the case of the DMV and the IRS,
respondents did not view control over credit card information as
necessary to achieve the respective administrative tasks, but were more
willing to allow it in the case of delinquent parents.
The last evaluative prong is the perception of the societal "good"
that is achieved by paternalistic actions. Respondents were more
likely to support using personal information, even in the form of credit
cards, when the governmental policy objective was designed to
achieve what they perceived to be a "good," whether it was the
identification of parents delinquent in child support payments, the
verification of tax payer information, or the identification of drivers
who were not in compliance with DMV requirements. The
identification of parents delinquent in child support payments received
the greatest support and the least concern with the divulgence of
personal information. Where individuals perceived paternalistic action
as necessary, they tended to accept the use of personal information,
even when there was a potential loss of control over personal
information. Individuals were willing to allow the use of this type of
information to a greater degree when the policy goal was desirable.
These initial findings indicate that the nature of the policy goal,
encompassing both the motive and the good to be achieved, affects the
acceptance of the use of personal information as well as the perception
of the legitimacy and attainability of the objective.
The survey moved from an identification of existing uses of
personal information to achieve policy objectives to some proposed
uses. To this end, each survey participant was asked a set of questions
about what he believed should be required for an identity check before
travelers board planes. Keeping a balance between privacy, data
sensitivity and a public policy purpose, the intent of these questions
was to determine how individuals perceived the use of certain forms of
personal data for the purpose of verifying an individual's identity
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before boarding an airplane. The public policy benefit was defined as
the possible reduction of terrorism. Data elements were presented to
the respondents separately to gauge particular sensitivities, in light of
the benefit of a potential increase in airline safety. It is important to
first note that 30% of respondents do not fly on a commercial airliner
in a typical year, and another 12% of the respondents reported that
they fly less than once a year. Respondents were asked about their
acceptance of various forms of personal information for the purposes
of verifying the identity of a traveler. Most were in favor of travelers
providing their names (96%), addresses (87%), dates of birth (87%)
and drivers' licenses (74%), while less were in favor of providing their
social security numbers (SSNs) (55%). Seventy-seven percent were
opposed to travelers providing their credit card numbers.
Respondents' Agreement to Use Identifiers
When Boarding a Plane
100% .
80% 4 ...
B~ 600/% ~4
240% 87% , ,
Name Address DOB SSN Driver's Credit
License Card
Identifier
Figure 6. Respondents 'Agreement to Use Identifiers
When Boarding a Plane
The general acceptance of the use of name, address, date of birth
and driver's license for the purposes of verifying a traveler's identity
might be explained in a number of different ways. The stated policy
goals of limiting terrorism and promoting airline safety affected
societal acceptance of this type of personal information. Yet, the
acceptance was somewhat limited. The legitimacy of using SSNs and
credit card information, for instance, was perceived as falling outside
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the bounds of acceptable paternalistic action of identifying travelers.
This indicates that a liberty interest in privacy would be compromised
in the attainment of this policy objective.
Compare these findings with the greater acceptance of all forms of
personal information for the purposes of tracking down parents who
were delinquent in child support payments. What drives the
acceptance of one form of paternalism over the other? Is there a
relationship between the type of information that is being requested
and the policy objective that is used to justify paternalistic action?
Clearly, some personal information is viewed as legitimate and
necessary to achieving a policy objective while credit card
information, for instance, is viewed as outside the range of acceptable
information. This may mean that personal information created and
used for a governmental purpose, like a driver's license or a social
security number, is viewed with less of a liberty interest in privacy
when compared to the use of credit card information co-opted for a
governmental purpose. Perhaps, the origin of the information and how
the information is linked to the administrative purpose for which it was
created also drive the difference in acceptance. In those areas where
the policy objective is novel, as is the case in the war on terror, or
where the relationship between the use of personal information and the
achievement of the policy objective is viewed as more tenuous or less
established, some reluctance in verifying a traveler's identity may be
related to a lack of established trust and confidence in the achievement
of the policy goal. Does the public have greater trust and confidence
in DMV and IRS usage of personal information? Does the policy goal
of identifying "dead-beat" dads evoke greater confidence and trust
than the identification of terrorists?
To better understand these types of questions, the survey
considered societal perceptions of trust and confidence in the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to safeguard the use of
personal information. Recall the example of a physician making a
judgment in the care of a patient. The evaluation of the physician's
decision to withhold or divulge information did not require that the
physician present all of the available information to the patient before
taking paternalistic action. In fact, the judgment is one that is made
solely by the physician.
The evaluation of the paternalistic act turns on the quality of the
judgment, with the expectation that the information is best evaluated
by the physician rather than the patient. Is the same true of the
judgment exercised by the government? In the case of the doctor-
patient relationship, the judgment of the physician is exercised to the
stated benefit of the patient. There must be trust on behalf of the
patient to accept this exercise of judgment. The same is true of action
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taken by the government on behalf of society. The public view of the
quality of government judgments can, in part, be measured by
evaluating the level of trust and confidence that the public has in the
ability of the government to use personal information responsibly. To
gauge the trust and confidence that the public had in the government,
respondents were asked a series of questions along these lines.
Respondents were divided on whether or not they generally trusted
the United States government to protect their personal information and
never misuse it. Fifty percent responded affirmatively when asked if
they were in agreement with the statement, "I trust that United States
government authorities protect my personal information and never
misuse it." Forty-nine percent disagreed with the statement.
Respondents' Agreement with the Following
Statement: "I trust that US government authorities
protect my personal information and never misuse
it."
1%
0l Agree or Strongly
49%'1 50% U Disagree or Strongly
Disagree
0 Don't Know
Figure 7: Respondents' Agreement with the Following Statement: "I
trust that US government authorities protect my personal information
and never misuse it."
On the other hand, most respondents believed that requiring
personal information for identity verification would be somewhat
effective (77%) or very effective (18%) in actually reducing the risk of
terrorism. One-fifth (20%) believed it would not be effective at all.
The acceptance of the use of personal information by the government
to achieve stated policy objectives is driven by countervailing
sentiments. On the one hand, a majority of respondents believed that
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the use of personal information for identity verification would be
somewhat or very effective in reducing the risk of terrorism. On the
other hand, there is a lack of confidence in the protection of personal
information from misuse. The existence of confidence was closely
related to a respondent's willingness to provide personal information.
When queried about confidence in the newly organized DHS
regarding the protection of personal information and the willingness to
divulge it, there were mixed levels of confidence which affected the
respondents' willingness to share personal information with DHS.
Table 1: Confidence in Homeland Security and Willingness to Provide
Personal Information
Willingness to
Survey Question Confidence Providein Homeland Personal
Security Information
How confident are you that the Dept. of 64% 67%
Homeland Security would prevent
personal information from being used for
anything other than what it says it would
be used for, that is, to check the identity
of travelers?
How confident are you that the Dept. of 54% 62%
Homeland Security would prevent
personal information from being used for
anything other than checking the identity
of travelers if the system was audited by
a third party?
How confident are you that the Dept. of 66% 73%
Homeland Security would protect
personal information in accordance with
privacy standards?
How confident are you that the Dept. of 69% 72%
Homeland Security would protect
personal information in accordance with
a written privacy policy that would be
given to travelers when they are
requested for the information?
In the process of verifying your identity 52% 77%
it is possible that inconsistencies may
arise, for instance if a person recently
moved and had an address change. How I
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Willingness to
Survey Question Confidence Provide
in Homeland Personal
Security Information
confident are you that the Dept. of
Homeland Security would correct
personal information within a reasonable
amount of time if this happened?
How confident are you that the Dept. of 55% 72%
Homeland Security would delete
personal information from its database
after the information was used to check
the identity of travelers if it said it would
do this?
The element of confidence reveals the acceptance of paternalistic
judgments made on behalf of society. Recall that the judgment of a
physician to withhold information from a patient is a form of
paternalism which, while potentially detrimental to the rights of the
patient, is nonetheless a practice in the medical profession.
Discretionary judgment is also part and parcel of our representative
democracy where confidence in representatives underpins their
authority to make decisions and judgments on behalf of their
constituents. In both instances, the acceptance of paternalistic
judgment does not turn on an appraisal of all of the evidence used as
the basis of the judgment but rather, depends upon the confidence in
the individual taking paternalistic action on one's behalf.
Does this finding have some bearing on societal perceptions of
secrecy in the post-September 11 environment? If respondents are
confident that personal information is used only for its intended
purpose, they are not necessarily making their confidence dependent
upon the ability to know all governmental uses of their personal
information. The question, in other words, is one that does not ask
about the openness of the use but rather, the judgment that DHS would
exercise in handling personal information. The absence of the
condition of overt or covert use is, in and of itself, revealing. Is it
necessary to have the ability to evaluate the evidentiary basis of a
judgment to place trust and confidence in the judgment of a physician
or the government? It would appear that it is not. The perception that
the judgment is valid and trustworthy seems more important than the
requirement that the evidence upon which the decision was based is
available for scrutiny. Yet, how is confidence gained and a
willingness to abide by the paternalistic use of personal information
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pursuit of internal security has made use of information gathering,
both overtly and covertly. As John Jay stated in The Federalist No. 64,
"[t]here are cases where the most useful intelligence may be obtained,
if the persons possessing it can be relieved from apprehensions of
discovery."'15 John Jay was not alone amongst the founding fathers of
the Constitution. The value in withholding certain types of sensitive
information, whether it was military or diplomatic intelligence, was an
acceptable and necessary tenet in democratic governance. 6 The
Supreme Court has also affirmed the need for secrecy throughout the
history of its jurisprudence. The Court stated, "[i]t is 'obvious and
unarguable' that no governmental interest is more compelling than the
security of the Nation."'
7
Yet, there have also been times in the history of the United States
when paternalistic action was viewed with suspicion. Consider points
in the history of the United States when confidence in the
government's judgment has waned. "Under the guise of patriotic
purpose and internal security, the Federalists enacted a program
designed to cripple, if not destroy, the Jeffersonian party."' 8 The Alien
and Sedition Acts of 1798 are early examples of a paternalistic
judgment which gradually lost public acceptance. Opposition to the
most controversial of the Acts, the Alien Friends Law (allowing the
President to order deportation of aliens) and the Sedition Law (making
seditious libel a criminal offense) 19 grew in large part due to lack of
confidence in the judgments being made and fear that there was no
oversight when powers were exercised under these Acts' authority.
Similarly, the "Red Scare," of which Joseph McCarthy was symbolic,
was not unlike the fear of French invasion that fed the call for the
Alien and Sedition Acts. With increasing international frustrations and
rising tensions with the Soviet Union following the end of World War
II, evidence of Communist espionage at the national level led to the
15 Hamilton, Alexander, John Jay, and James Madison, The Federalist, ed. Henry Cabot Lodge
(New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1888), 403.
16 Robert F. Turner, War and the Forgotten Executive Power Clause of the Constitution: A
Review Essay of John Hart Ely's War and Responsibility, Virginia J. of International Law 34,
no. 4 (1994): 903, 922.
17 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (quoting Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378
U.S. 500, 509 (1964)).
1s James M. Smith, Freedom's Fetters: The Alien and Sedition Laws and American Civil
Liberties (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1956), 21.
'9 Ibid, 435-42.
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movement to cleanse America of Communist influence. The
combined effort of the Republicans, with the use of the House Un-
American Activities Committee (HUAC), and Truman's loyalty
boards led to action based on anonymous accusations, exploration of
political beliefs of employees, and the gathering of evidence by
investigating committees of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
"State governments followed suit with loyalty investigations of their
own... while private industry and some unions adopted loyalty
programs. Eventually, the unsanctioned pursuit of Communists
came under question as confidence began to wane in the judgments
being made.
Though a more detailed comparison of these points in history with
the current context is outside of the scope of this paper, it is possible to
posit some explanations for societal acceptance of the use of personal
information in the pursuit of governmental policy objectives and
comment on possible implications for understanding societal
perceptions of secrecy. It appears that societal acceptance of the use
of personal information for the pursuit of policy objectives is driven by
confidence in the judgment being made. The elements of the judgment
include the evaluative prongs of paternalism that have been discussed,
including the motive for and the posited good of the stated policy. In
those instances when trust and confidence have not been established,
some safeguards are needed to ensure that the judgment is in keeping
with the stated policy objective. This finding might have also been
true for societal acceptance, or eventual lack thereof, in the search for
Communists during the Red Scare. The sense that paternalistic
judgments by the government could no longer be trusted undermined
societal acceptance of the policy objectives and the use of information
to achieve them.
When confidence in governmental objectives or institutions is not
well established, safeguards seem to assuage the public and ensure
acceptance of the use of personal information to achieve policy
objectives. This may explain a relative lack of confidence in current
DHS policy objectives and a higher level of confidence when
safeguards are in set place. These findings may indicate that it is not a
matter of whether the use of personal information is covert or overt but
rather, a matter of how much trust and confidence can be placed in the
paternalistic action undertaken. Based upon this study, it appears that
elements of paternalistic judgment are perhaps more important than
20 Seth Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension between Privacy and
Disclosure in Constitutional Law, University of Pennsylvania Law Review 140, no. 1 (1991),
16-17.
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whether society has the opportunity to evaluate the evidentiary basis of
the decision.

